NEWSGROUPS FLOAT INTO SAFE HARBOR,
AND COPYRIGHT HOLDERS ARE SUNK
ALICIA L. WRIGHT 1

ABSTRACT
Usenet newsgroups are swiftly becoming a popular
vehicle for pirating digital music, movies, books, and other
copyrighted works. Meanwhile, courts ignore Usenet’s
tremendous potential for copyright infringement. In Ellison
v. Robertson, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that
America Online’s Usenet service might qualify for safe
harbor under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
According to the district court below, safe harbor would
preclude a finding of secondary copyright infringement
against America Online. However, the courts misinterpreted
the safe harbor provisions. One safe harbor provision was
misapplied and another was ignored altogether. This iBrief
critiques the Ellison opinions and analyzes the application of
the safe harbor provisions to Usenet operators.
INTRODUCTION
After major entertainment companies declared war against
popular file-sharing networks, digital pirates were forced to explore
other options. 2 Usenet is one of these other options. 3 Conceived by
two Duke University graduate students in 1979, 4 Usenet is a
distributed discussion network now containing over 100,000
newsgroups.5 Each newsgroup is a topical discussion board on which
¶1
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users can post messages. 6 When a user posts a message to the news
server operated by that user’s internet service provider (“ISP”), the
message is copied to other ISPs’ servers as part of an automatic
process called “peering.” 7 Because many servers are passing
messages between one another, each message eventually exists on all
connected servers. 8
Usenet newsgroups are swiftly gaining popularity. The
volume of data stored on newsgroups doubles every eight to twelve
months. 9 Among files existing in newsgroup posts are purportedly
illegal copies of episodes of the television shows Lost and Desperate
Housewives, and copies of the movies Star Wars Episode III,
Chronicles of Narnia, and King Kong. 10
¶2

In Usenet’s early years, only text files could be distributed
over newsgroups.11 This was initially a major drawback for those
wishing to share digital media. However, the text-only restriction led
to innovation. There are now tools available to encode digital media
into text files before posting them.12 First, a user encodes a binary
media file into text and posts the file on a news server. When another
user downloads a file, she simply decodes the text to retrieve the
original media.
¶3

In Ellison v. Robertson, 13 the Ninth Circuit found that
America Online (“AOL”) might be shielded from liability for
secondary copyright infringement for its operation of Usenet
newsgroups. 14 This was not the first time a court refused to find
¶4
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infringement despite the tremendous capacity for copyright
infringement in newsgroups. 15
Ellison sued AOL, alleging contributory and vicarious
copyright infringement for AOL’s role in operating Usenet on its
servers. 16 Although AOL did not operate the server onto which the
infringing posts were originally uploaded, it automatically received
the posts from other servers through peering. 17 As per its policy to
retain posts for fourteen days, AOL stored the infringing material on
its servers. 18 To avoid infringement liability, AOL sought safe
harbor under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). 19
The DMCA offers four safe harbors for ISPs whose role in copyright
infringement is passive or automatic, and meets certain other
parameters. 20 When a certain ISP activity falls under a safe harbor,
the ISP may be held liable only for limited equitable relief and cannot
be held liable for monetary relief. 21 AOL invoked two of these safe
harbors, the “Transitory Communications Safe Harbor” 22 and the
“Network Storage Safe Harbor,” 23 but did not assert the remaining
two safe harbors. 24
¶5

15

See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907
F. Supp. 1361, 1381 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that the Usenet operator in
question was not liable for direct or vicarious copyright infringement for its
automatic copying of infringing material posted by Usenet users, and the Usenet
operator could only my contributorily liable if it ignored complaint letters from
the copyright-holder).
16
Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1074.
17
Id. at 1075.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 1074.
20
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 656-57 (N.D. Ill. 2002),
aff’d, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
21
17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d), (j) (2000).
22
Id. § 512(a). The given title, “Transitory Communications Safe Harbor,” is
not an official title of the safe harbor but is merely used by the author for
convenience throughout this iBrief.
23
Id. § 512(c). The given title, “Network Storage Safe Harbor,” is not an
official title of the safe harbor but is merely used by the author for convenience
throughout this iBrief.
24
Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 357 F.3d at 1074 (9th Cir. 2004). The two
assumedly inapplicable safe harbors are the “System Caching Safe Harbor,” 17
U.S.C. § 512(b), and the “Information Location Tools Safe Harbor,” id.
§ 512(d). As with the first two mentioned safe harbor provisions, the given titles

2006

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 19

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
AOL, allowing AOL a complete shield from liability under the
Transitory Communications Safe Harbor. 25 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit remanded for fact-finding on whether AOL met the threshold
eligibility requirements for safe harbor protection. 26 However, the
Ninth Circuit did not upset the district court’s assumption that a
single safe harbor precluded all monetary liability. 27 As will be
demonstrated in this iBrief, both the district court and the Ninth
Circuit misinterpreted the application of the safe harbors.
¶6

The remainder of this iBrief is divided into three sections:
The first section examines the position of Usenet-operating ISPs
under the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor. The second
section examines the courts’ failure to consider other safe harbors,
particularly the Network Storage Safe Harbor. The final section
examines differences between the effects of the Transitory
Communications and the Network Storage safe harbors. Throughout
these sections, this iBrief will critique the Ellison holdings of both the
district court and the Ninth Circuit.
¶7

I. TRANSITORY COMMUNICATIONS SAFE HARBOR
In Ellison, both the Ninth Circuit and the district court
determined that AOL satisfied the requirements for a limitation of
liability under the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor. 28 These
decisions incorrectly applied the Transitory Communications Safe
Harbor.
No party can take advantage of the Transitory
¶8

of these two are used by the author for convenience and are not official titles of
the safe harbors.
25
Ellison, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1072 (granting summary judgment to AOL without
considering the application of any other safe harbor).
26
Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1082 (9th Cir. 2004). Before there can
be a limitation on liability under a safe harbor, an alleged copyright infringer
must meet threshold eligibility requirements. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i). Under
§ 512(i), a qualifying services provider must adopt, reasonably implement, and
inform subscribers about a policy for terminating the subscription of repeat
infringers. § 512(i)(1). Further, a qualifying service provider must
accommodate and may not interfere with certain standard technical measures
used to prevent copyright infringement. § 512(i). Whether these threshold
conditions are met is beyond the scope of this iBrief.
27
See Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1081 n.12 (declining to consider the application of the
Network Storage Safe Harbor on the grounds that other matters had yet to be
decided).
28
See id. at 1082; see also Ellison, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1072.
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Communications Safe Harbor unless it meets the applicable definition
of “service provider.” 29 Under the Transitory Communications Safe
Harbor, a service provider is protected from monetary liability for
copyright infringement
by reason of the provider’s transmitting, routing, or providing
connections for, material through a system or network controlled or
operated by or for the service provider, or by reason of the
intermediate and transient storage of that material in the course of such
transmitting, routing, or providing connections, [only] if . . . the
transmission, routing, provision of connections, or storage is carried
out through an automatic technical process without selection of the
material by the service provider; . . . [and] no copy of the material
made by the service provider in the course of such intermediate or
transient storage is maintained on the system or network in a manner
ordinarily accessible to anyone other than anticipated recipients, and
no such copy is maintained on the system or network in a manner
ordinarily accessible to such anticipated recipients for a longer period
than is reasonably necessary for the transmission, routing, or provision
of connections . . . . 30

The district court and the Ninth Circuit made at least five
mistakes in their analyses of AOL’s position under this safe harbor.
First, the courts assumed that AOL fit the definition of service
provider. Second, they found that AOL did not select the transmitted
material. 31 Third, they determined that AOL’s retention of posts for
fourteen days was intermediate and transient. 32 Fourth, they decided
that the fourteen-day holding period was reasonably necessary for
transmission, routing, or provision of connections. 33 Fifth, the courts
failed to consider the effect of the term “anticipated recipients” in the
statute. In this iBrief, the fourth and fifth of these mistakes will be
considered together because the issues involved are intertwined.
¶9

A. Definition of Service Provider
For the purposes of this safe harbor, a “service provider” is a
party that offers “transmission, routing, or provision of connections
for digital online communications, between or among points specified
¶10

29

H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 63 (1998).
17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (a)(2), (a)(4).
31
Ellison, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
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30
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by a user, of material of the user's choosing.” 34 When considering
the totality of its offered services, AOL may qualify as a service
provider for purposes of the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor.
However, the fact that a provider offers some services that meet this
definition does not imply that the provider qualifies for the safe
harbor with respect to its other activities. 35 In its capacity as a Usenet
operator, AOL fails to qualify as a service provider under the
Transitory Communications Safe Harbor. 36
AOL’s allegedly infringing conduct is its transmission and
temporary storage of Usenet posts. To qualify as a service provider,
such transmission must occur only between points specified by a
user. However, after Usenet users upload posts, they have no control
over where such posts are sent. The path of transmission is always
essentially the same. After receiving a post, AOL stores the post’s
contents on its servers and transfers the post to other ISPs by way of
peering. These actions occur regardless of the desires or directions of
posting users. Even if users have knowledge of the locations to
which their posts will be transmitted, they have no control over the
selection of these locations. Such locations are not specified by a
user but are predetermined by the peering process. As such, in its
capacity as Usenet operator, AOL is not a service provider for the
purposes of the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor.
¶11

B. Selection of Material
An ISP is disqualified from this safe harbor if the transmitted
material is selected by the ISP, rather than selected by an automatic
process or by the ISP’s users. 37 While AOL does not select
individual postings, it does select which newsgroups to host on its
servers. 38 The district court in Ellison found that “selection” referred
¶12

34

17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 64 (1998) (“[T]he fact that a provider
performs some functions that fall within the definition of new subparagraph (A)
does not imply that its other functions that do not fall within the definition of
new subparagraph (A) qualify for the limitation of liability under new
subsection (a).”).
36
However, a broader definition of “service provider” applies to the other three
safe harbors. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B). Therefore, parties that fail to qualify as
“service provider” under the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor may still
qualify as “service provider” under the other safe harbors.
37
Id. § 512(a)(2).
38
Ellison, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
35
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to selection of the specific infringing material—the allegedly
infringing posts. This construction ignores the legislative history and
the plain meaning of the statutory text.
“Selection of material” refers to “the editorial function of
determining what material to send, or the specific sources of material
to place on-line (e.g., a radio station), rather than ‘an automatic
technical process’ of responding to a command or request, such as
one from a user, an Internet location tool, or another network.”39 The
district court’s construction of “selection” as referring to the specific
infringing material ignores Congress’s intent that the term also refer
to an ISP’s selection of sources of material. According to a House
Commerce Committee Report, selection of a source, such as selecting
a particular radio station to broadcast, qualifies as “selection” under
the safe harbor. 40 In this case, AOL’s decision to host Usenet is
analogous to a decision to broadcast radio stations, and AOL’s
selection of certain newsgroups corresponds to selection of specific
radio stations. This is the kind of selection that disqualifies an ISP
from limitation on liability under the Transitory Communications
Safe Harbor.
¶13

Furthermore, the statutory text makes no distinction between
selection of infringing material and selection of non-infringing
material. The safe harbor applies to ISPs whose transmissions are
“carried out through automatic technical process[es] without
selection of the material by the service provider[s].” 41 The proper
distinction is between selection by automatic processes and selection
by the ISPs. The Ellison court read into the text an additional
requirement not intended by Congress.
¶14

C. Intermediate and Transient
In order for an ISP to fall under the Transitory
Communications Safe Harbor, and thereby avoid liability for its
temporary storage of infringing material, such storage must be both
“intermediate and transient.” 42 AOL’s Usenet storage fails this test.
¶15

The Ninth Circuit dispatched this “intermediate and transient”
requirement in AOL’s favor by claiming that the safe harbor was
¶16

39

H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 51 (emphasis added).
Id.
41
17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(2).
42
Id. § 512(a).
40
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meant to codify the result of Religious Technology Center v. Netcom
On-Line Communication Services. 43 In Netcom, the court held that
the Usenet operator in question was not liable for direct or vicarious
copyright infringement for its automatic copying of infringing
material posted by Usenet users. 44 In that case, the Usenet operator
maintained each post on its server for eleven days before deletion. 45
In Ellison, AOL maintained posts on its system for fourteen days. 46
The district court held that the three-day difference was insufficient to
distinguish Ellison from Netcom, 47 and the Ninth Circuit agreed. 48
The courts are correct that Netcom had a large influence over
the development of the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor. In
fact, a House Judiciary Committee Report expressly states that this
safe harbor “codifies the result of Netcom.” 49 The Ninth Circuit,
however, takes this statement out of context. With respect to
secondary liability, the “intermediate and transient” requirement of
the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor codifies only a very
specific element of Netcom’s holding. As stated in the House
Judiciary Committee Report:
¶17

Netcom recognizes implicitly that intermediate copies may be retained
without liability for only a limited period of time. The requirement
that “no copy [be] maintained on the system or network . . . for a
longer period than reasonably necessary for the transmission” is drawn
from the facts of the Netcom case, and is intended to codify this
implicit limitation in the Netcom holding. 50

43

Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Cal. 1995)).
44
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1381.
45
Id. at 1367.
46
Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 357 F.3d at 1074 (9th Cir. 2004).
47
Id.
48
Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1081.
49
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 24 (1998) (citations omitted).
50
Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(4) (2000)) (alteration in original). It should be
noted that the Judiciary Committee Report refers to an earlier version of the
legislation, which was not ultimately enacted as it existed at that time. CoStar
Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 554 (4th Cir. 2004). However, the
distinction between the earlier bill and the enacted statute is probably not
relevant to issues of secondary infringement, see id. at 554-55, such as the issues
involved in the case of Usenet operators.
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The “intermediate and transient” requirement for safe harbor
codifies Netcom only in that it allows ISPs to avoid liability for
temporary storage during the transmission of material. The safe
harbor provision is silent as to exactly how long material may be
stored for the purpose of transmission. On this point, Netcom is
merely a persuasive precedent and is not raised to the level of statute.
¶18

The plain meaning of statutory text is the controlling factor in
application of a statute. 51 Plain meaning can be determined based on
the common usage of included terms. In common usage, “transient”
is defined as “passing away with time; not permanent; temporary;
transitory.” 52 “Transitory” means “adapted for passing through.” 53
¶19

Even AOL admitted that it takes no more than a few hours to
complete the peering process.54 During peering, material passes from
AOL’s servers onto the servers of other ISPs. Storage is not
transitory after those first few hours. After peering, AOL does
nothing with its posts except allow them to sit undisturbed on its
networks. At that point, the material is no longer “passing through”
AOL’s servers. To the contrary, material remains on the networks
only because of AOL’s policy to retain posts for a specified period of
time.
¶20

Admittedly, storage for eleven days, fourteen days, one
hundred days, or even one million days qualifies as “passing away
with time” and “not permanent,” arguably meeting the definition of
transient. However, this interpretation qualifies all ISPs that plan to
eventually delete posts. Because Congress provided for a separate
safe harbor to limit liability for certain longer term storage, the
Network Storage Safe Harbor, it is doubtful that Congress intended to
include all possible storage durations under the Transitory
Communications Safe Harbor.
¶21

51

United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (“There is,
of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the
words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes.”);
United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The primary
indication of [congressional] intent is the language of the statute.”), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part on other grounds, 515 US 593 (1995).
52
WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1420 (3d Coll. ed. 1988).
53
Id. at 1421.
54
Answering Brief of Appellee America Online, Inc. at 45-46, Ellison v.
Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-55797), 2002 WL 32303144.
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The district court correctly pointed out that temporary storage
of an email message in transit is the typical example of intermediate
and transient storage. 55 A House Commerce Committee Report
voices its approval of an email service provider as the type of ISP
protected by the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor. 56
“‘Intermediate and transient’ refers to such a copy made and/or stored
in the course of a transmission, not a copy made or stored at the
points where the transmission is initiated or received.” 57 In other
words, this particular safe harbor only limits liability with respect to
certain temporary copies made for transmission. An email message
passes quickly through an ISP’s server from sender to recipient. In
contrast, a newsgroup post remains at an intermediate point—on an
ISP’s server, ready to be downloaded by any user—for some prespecified period of time that is unrelated to the time it takes for the
post to pass through the server. While the fourteen-day storage is
temporary, it is not transitory and, therefore, not transient.
¶22

In this case, the plain meaning of the statute conflicts with the
Netcom decision. The Ellison courts should have looked to the
meaning of the statute instead of relying solely on Netcom. 58 A
Usenet operator with a fourteen-day storage policy does not meet the
intermediate and transient requirement and, therefore, does not
qualify for the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor.
¶23

D. Reasonably Necessary Retention Period & Anticipated Recipients
An ISP does not qualify for the Transitory Communications
Safe Harbor unless its stored material is made accessible to
anticipated recipients for no longer than is reasonably necessary for
transmission, routing, or provision of connections. 59 Furthermore,
posted material is not to be made accessible to unanticipated
recipients for any period of time. 60 AOL failed to meet these
requirements.
¶24

Once again, the Ellison courts relied on the facts of Netcom to
decide that fourteen days was a reasonable retention period. The
¶25

55

See Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1068 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d
in part, rev’d in par on other grounds, 357 F.3d at 1074 (9th Cir. 2004).
56
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 51 (1998).
57
Id. at 50-51.
58
See United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
59
17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(4) (2000).
60
Id.
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Ninth Circuit’s only answer to the “reasonably necessary”
requirement was that “Congress intended the relevant language of
[this safe harbor] to codify the result of Netcom.” 61 The courts
misplaced their loyalties. The language of the statute controls the
issue; 62 the facts of Netcom are merely persuasive and should not
control when contradicting the plain language of the statute.
The DMCA safe harbor statute gives no guidance as to what
retention periods would qualify as reasonably necessary for
transmission. To determine an acceptable retention period, one
should keep in mind the goal of retention. AOL and other Usenet
operators retain posts for two reasons: to transfer material to other
ISPs’ servers, and to allow users to download posts. For safe harbor,
only anticipated users are allowed access to posts on an ISP’s Usenet
server. 63 Therefore, a qualifying ISP can retain material in a manner
accessible to the public for no longer than is reasonably necessary for
other servers and for anticipated users to retrieve such material.
¶26

It takes only a few hours for AOL to transfer material to other
servers, 64 so fourteen days is longer than is reasonably necessary for
the transmission of material to other ISPs. However, the fourteen-day
retention period may still be acceptable if it is reasonably necessary
to deliver material to anticipated users. Unfortunately for Usenet
operators, this is not the case.
¶27

Neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit considered the
effect of the repeated term “anticipated recipients” in the safe harbor
provision. It is unlikely that Congress included this term without
intent for it to have meaning. “Anticipate” means “to look forward
to; expect.” 65 “Expect” is defined as “to look for as likely to occur or
appear.” 66 A qualifying ISP must ensure that material on its system
is ordinarily accessible only to those recipients who are likely and
expected to acquire such material. 67 The entire public is unlikely to
download any one post. Furthermore, an interpretation of
“anticipated” to refer to the entire public would eliminate the purpose
of including the term in the statute at all. It is unlikely that Congress
¶28

61

Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004).
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. at 543.
63
17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(4).
64
Answering Brief of Appellee America Online, Inc., supra note 54, at 45-46.
65
WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, supra note 52, at 59.
66
Id. at 478.
67
17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(4).
62
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meant the word to be ignored, 68 so there must be specific anticipated
recipients for each post.
The previously mentioned House Commerce Committee
Report presents two examples of temporary storage that qualify for
this safe harbor: storage on a mail server while an email message is in
transit, and storage of a web page in the course of transmission to a
specific user. 69 Both of these examples involve transmission to
specific users, and these users are anticipated recipients. In contrast
with these examples, Usenet posts are not intended for specific users.
¶29

Furthermore, the definition of “service provider” under this
safe harbor supports the proposed construction that there must be
specific intended recipients of stored material. Recall that a service
provider is an entity that “offer[s] the transmission, routing, or
providing of connections for digital online communications, between
or among points specified by a user.” 70 If an ISP can only transmit
material between or among specified points, such points correspond
to anticipated recipients. If “anticipated recipients” can be read to
refer to the entire public, then necessarily, no user has specified
points between or among which material is to be transmitted. Such a
broad interpretation would be contrary to the definition of “service
provider.”
¶30

The set of anticipated recipients can only be defined by the
user posting material on a newsgroup. Any likely and expected
recipient has probably had some prior contact with the posting user
over a newsgroup or elsewhere, or perhaps the set of likely and
expected recipients includes all frequent users of a particular
newsgroup. Such recipients do not need fourteen days to find and
download a newsgroup post. Furthermore, posts containing only
legal material are primarily composed of text, rather than encoded
digital pirated works. Text files can be downloaded in seconds over
today’s internet connections. If the purpose of a newsgroup is
discussion and swapping of legal files, fourteen days is more than is
reasonably necessary to accomplish this task. Swapping files with
anticipated recipients need not take more than a few days.
¶31

68

See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (“In construing a
statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used.”).
69
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 51 (1998).
70
17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A).
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If there are anticipated recipients, then others are
unanticipated. Where Usenet is available, it is generally open to the
public. 71 Consequently, even users unlikely and unexpected to
receive a particular post have access to that post. To qualify for the
Transitory Communications Safe Harbor, an ISP must ensure that
material is not available to unanticipated recipients.72 While material
is retained by a Usenet operator, all users have access—including
unanticipated users.
¶32

AOL and other Usenet operators make material accessible to
anticipated users for longer than is reasonably necessary.
Furthermore, they fail to ensure that material is inaccessible to
unanticipated users. Therefore, Usenet operators do not meet the
requirements for the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor.
¶33

II.

FAILURE TO CONSIDER OTHER SAFE HARBORS

In Ellison, neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit
considered the application of any safe harbor other than the
Transitory Communications Safe Harbor. In fact, the district court
assumed that it was unnecessary to consider the Network Storage
Safe Harbor after finding that the Transitory Communications Safe
Harbor applied. 73 The Ninth Circuit failed to correct this
assumption, 74 which was based on a misinterpretation of the safe
harbor provisions.
¶34

Although the district court did not explain the basis for its
decision not to consider the Network Storage Safe Harbor, logically,
there are two possible reasons for this choice: Either the district court
assumed that the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor provides
blanket immunity for copyright infringement, or the district court felt
that the limitation on liability covered all of AOL’s actions in this
particular instance. In either case, the district court’s reasoning
would be incorrect.
¶35

71

Desmond, supra note 2, at 27.
17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(4).
73
Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1072 n.22 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 357 F.3d at 1074 (9th Cir. 2004).
74
See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1081 n.12 (9th Cir. 2004) (declining
to consider the application of the Network Storage Safe Harbor on the grounds
that other matters had yet to be decided).
72
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A. No Blanket Immunity
The DMCA provides four separate safe harbors, and
qualification under one safe harbor has no impact on potential
qualification under another. 75 An ISP may need to qualify for
multiple safe harbors to be completely shielded from monetary
liability. A Senate Judiciary Committee Report provides a useful
example of this principle: Consider an ISP that provides a hyperlink
to a site containing infringing material. The ISP caches the infringing
material on its system to facilitate access by its users. Now suppose a
party claims infringement for both the ISP’s system caching and its
use of location tools. If the ISP wishes to be shielded from monetary
liability, it needs the protections of both the System Caching Safe
Harbor 76 and the Information Location Tools Safe Harbor. 77
¶36

If the district court’s refusal to consider the Network Storage
Safe Harbor was based on a belief that the Transitory
Communications Safe Harbor provides blanket immunity, then the
court misunderstood the structure of the safe harbor provisions. Such
a belief ignores the statutory language as well as the legislative
history.
¶37

B. Transitory Communications Safe Harbor is Insufficient in This
Case
While the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor may
protect a Usenet operator from copyright infringement for its
transferring material to and from other ISPs’ servers, it does not
protect the operator from continued storage for more than a few
days. 78 Where a Usenet operator retains material for fourteen days,
the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor is not enough to shield
the ISP from all monetary liability. Other safe harbors should be
considered.
¶38

III.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SAFE HARBORS

Aside from limiting liability for different categories of ISP
conduct, the effects of Transitory Communications Safe Harbor and
the Network Storage Safe Harbor, which the Ellison courts failed to
¶39
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17 U.S.C. § 512(n).
Id. § 512(b).
77
Id. § 512(d); S. REP. 105-190, at 55-56 (1998).
78
See discussion supra Part I.D.
76
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consider, differ in two significant respects: The Network Storage
Safe Harbor includes provisions for “notice and take-down”
procedures 79 and for subpoena issuance. 80 Whether the Network
Storage Safe Harbor applies to Usenet operators is beyond the scope
of this iBrief. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Transitory
Communications Safe Harbor is more lenient on qualifying ISPs in
that it does not have the notice and take-down procedures and
subpoena provisions.
To maintain qualification for the Network Storage Safe
Harbor, an ISP must comply with notice and take-down procedures
by which it expeditiously removes, or disables access to, allegedly
infringing material. 81 The notice and take-down procedures were
instituted to create a cooperative process by which copyright holders
and ISPs could work to minimize the amount of infringing material
on ISPs’ systems. 82 The notice and take-down procedures require an
ISP to remove allegedly infringing material when the ISP has been
formally notified of the existence of such material. 83 Such material
must be replaced if the ISP receives formal counter-notification from
the allegedly infringing user, unless the copyright holder notifies the
ISP that he intends to litigate the infringement issue. 84
¶40

¶41
The subpoena provisions allow a party to compel an ISP to
disclose the names of subscribers whom such party believes are
infringing its copyrights. 85 Subpoenas can be issued to ISPs that
qualify under the Network Storage Safe Harbor but cannot be issued
to ISPs for activity that qualifies for safe harbor under the Transitory
Communications Safe Harbor. 86 For a subpoena to issue, the
copyright holder must specify the infringing material to be removed
or to which access is to be disabled. 87 In theory, ISPs that qualify
only under the latter safe harbor are mere conduits for transferring
data. 88 Such ISPs “can neither ‘remove’ nor ‘disable access to’ the
79

17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2).
Id. § 512(h).
81
Id. § 512(g)(2).
82
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 54 (1998).
83
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).
84
Id. § 512(g)(2)(C).
85
Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d 1229,
1232 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)).
86
Id. at 1233.
87
17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(4), (c)(3)(A)(iii).
88
Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 351 F.3d at 1237.
80
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infringing material because that material is not stored on the ISP’s
servers.” 89 Given this, no subpoena may issue to compel an ISP to
reveal of identities of infringing users, where such ISP’s allegedly
infringing activity falls under the Transitory Communications Safe
Harbor. 90
The fact that the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor has
no notice and take-down procedures and no subpoena provisions has
tremendous implications for Usenet operators. If a court finds that
Usenet operators qualify for the Transitory Communications Safe
Harbor, these operators will not be required to remove infringing
material, and no subpoena may issue to the operators requiring
disclosure of subscriber names. In short, it becomes more difficult, if
not impossible, to compel Usenet operators to assist in eliminating
infringing material from their systems, when courts deem those
operators’ activities to fall under the Transitory Communications Safe
Harbor.
¶42

CONCLUSION
In finding that Usenet-operator AOL might be shielded from
liability for secondary copyright infringement, the Ellison courts
ignored the tremendous potential for copyright infringement in
newsgroups. Ellison misinterpreted the Transitory Communications
Safe Harbor to provide blanket immunity for copyright infringement.
The courts also disregarded the potential application of the Network
Storage Safe Harbor, which might have limited AOL’s liability.
Furthermore, if the courts had found that the Network Storage Safe
Harbor, as opposed to the Transitory Communications Safe Harbor,
applied to AOL, copyright holders would have means to protect their
copyrighted works by way of the notice and take-down procedures
and the subpoena provisions.
¶43

Perhaps courts are concerned that requiring strict standards for
qualification under the safe harbors will put too much pressure on
ISPs. ISPs like AOL play an indispensable role in providing internet
access to the masses. However, courts need not be so concerned that
they limit liability without thorough analysis. The safe harbors
provide an extra line of defense for ISPs. Even when an ISP fails to
qualify for safe harbor, it may still be able to avoid liability for
¶44

89
90

Id. at 1235.
Id. at 1236.
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copyright infringement. The safe harbors do not replace the
traditional analyses of direct, contributory, and vicarious copyright
infringement. 91 Failure to qualify for safe harbor simply means that
an ISP will have to litigate the traditional infringement issues. 92
Liability is not implied simply because an ISP does not fall under a
safe harbor.
If courts truly wish to alleviate the problem of piracy on the
internet, they need to interpret copyright law more strictly. ISPs need
to be aware of the potential for illegal conduct on their networks. A
strict interpretation of copyright protection laws will not put ISPs out
of business.
Finding ISPs liable for secondary copyright
infringement encourages ISPs to offer services that have a lesser
potential for distributing illegal material. In contrast, shielding
secondary infringers only allows pirates the means to illegally
reproduce and distribute copyrighted works.
¶45

91

Perfect 10 v. Cybernet Ventures, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 50 (1998)).
92
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 50.

